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THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
With the growth of interdependence in our nation's economy, the
worker's right to strike over wages and working conditions has been severely
questioned. The focal point of this questioning has centered on strikes af-
fecting the public interest. Since the future promises to bring more economic
interdependence, this area of public interest would seem to be ever-growing.
It is, therefore, important that an analysis of the right to strike be made
before rash solutions destroy the self-determination of America's labor force
in relation to its responsibilities and rights.
HISTORY
The first judicial treatment of strike controversies in Anglo-American
law occurred in eighteenth century England. Small organizations of trades-
men in local communities were formed. Since most of these organizations
consisted of skilled tradesmen, the purpose of these early "unions" was to
give the worker a determinative voice in wage scales and not necessarily to
contest other working conditions. The common law courts of England took a
dim view of the trend to organize and strike. Because of the importance of
property rights and economic growth in furtherance of international trade,
the early English courts considered the strike an unnatural event and an
attack upon the law of supply and demand. The courts reasoned that the
price of a good should be determined "naturally" through supply and
demand. When the workers went out on strike, they coerced the employers
into higher wages which, in turn, forced prices of goods upwards. Such a
coercion was considered, therefore, to be a criminal conspiracy bent upon
destruction of the nation's economy and the employer's property rights.1
This view was carried over into post-Revolutionary America. The first
recorded American strike occurred in 1786 and culminated in the famous
Philadelphia Cordwainer's Case of 1806.2 The shoemakers of Philadelphia,
who had formed a guild, demanded a wage increase. When the demand was
rejected, the shoemakers went out on strike. The employers immediately
pressured the public prosecutor to indict the members of the guild for crim-
inal conspiracy. The guild members were found guilty and the court enun-
dated the English doctrine of "natural" economics.
This judicial sentiment against labor organizations was amplified with
the growth of worker demands. In 1835 the Supreme Court of New York
again held a strike to be the implementation of a criminal conspiracy.3 This
time, however, the decision rested upon statutory construction. New York
1 Gregory, Labor and the Law, W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, New York, 1961.
2 Commonwealth v. Pullis (1806), as reported in Commons & Gilmore, Documentary
History of American Industrial Society, pp. 59-236.
3 People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 10 (1835).
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had passed a statute designed to protect the public from conspiracy against
the public health and morals. The statute was extremely vague. The court
construed this statute to include a prohibition against labor unions.
The first legalization of American unions came from the heretofore
conservative courts of Massachusetts. In a criminal conspiracy action against
union members for striking an employer who hired non-union members, the
court held the strike to be a legal act.4 The court reasoned that the use of
the strike weapon to promote union membership was a worthwhile method
for strengthening a just and needed social institution. The court strained to
prove the social value of unions by stating that in times of distress such an
organization might work for the public welfare. In pursuance of cultured
goals, the court continued, unions were ideal structures to promote art and
give aid to the poor, needy and sick. The weakness of this decision was to be
emphasized in early twentieth century decisions.
In 1908 the Danbury Hatter's Case5 dealt a severe blow to union growth.
A union of hatters went out on strike because an employer denied the right
to organize. The union also boycotted his business. The employer alleged
that these union practices were in restraint of trade and prohibited by the
Sherman Act. The court sustained his position and held unions to be illegal
combinations in restraint of trade.
The Danbury decision was carried farther in Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co.6 When a local union applied to the American Federation of
Labor for aid against the employer, Samuel Gompers ordered a secondary
boycott of the company. Gompers refused to discontinue the boycott upon
being enjoined and was later found guilty of contempt. The Court sustained
the conviction and held that secondary boycotts were also illegal restraints
of trade.
The Danbury Hatters and Gompers decisions were negated in 1914 by
Congress. The Clayton Act made anti-trust laws inapplicable to unions by
stating, "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of com-
merce."
7
To combat the growth of unionization, and later the power given the
unions by the Clayton Act, employers instituted the use of "yellow-dog"
contracts. These contracts, in effect, were promises of employees not to join
or to disassociate themselves from unions in exchange for being employed.
The unions mustered enough strength to have state legislatures pass statutes
making these contracts criminal. However, the Supreme Court held these
4 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metcalf 111 (1842).
5 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 US. 274, 52 L.Ed. 488 (1908).
6 221 U.S. 418, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911).
7 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
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statutes to be repugnant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as inva-
sions of the freedom to contract.8
Since World War I necessitated co-operation between labor and manage-
ment, this period was one of relative calm in the labor-management sphere.
However, out of the depression of the 1930's came two significant pieces of
legislation. The Norris-La Guardia Act9 of 1932 limited the use of the in-
junction against union strikes and the Wagner Act (National Labor Rela-
tions Act)10 guaranteed the right to organize and bargain collectively through
the unions own selected representatives.
With the exception of Taft-Hartley," which gave the government power
to temporarily enjoin strikes affecting the public health and safety, the legal
rights of the parties remain unchanged today. With the depression legisla-
tion underlying union rights, only somewhat limited by Taft-Hartley, and
the growth of interdependence in the economy since World War II, the stage
was set for the inevitable controversy over workers' rights versus the public
interest which is becoming increasingly important today.
STRIKE POWER
The strike is best typified as the emanating force of union power. In
reality, the measure of a union's right to strike is a measure of its power.
The necessity for the power and, therefore, the right of workers to organize
is inherent in the management-labor relationship. If the American ideal of
equality is to be realized in management-labor relationships, the power of
labor must be equal to that of management. Since it is unreasonable to
attempt to split management into unorganized individuals, it is also un-
reasonable to split labor, for doing so would be to create a guarantee of in-
equality. The right to strike is, therefore, a necessity in maintaining equality.
The measure of the power of a union and, therefore, the strike power
is best typified by Chamberlain's Formula,12
B's Cost of Disagreeing on A's TermsBargaining Power =
A B's Cost of Agreeing on A's Terms
While the formula is for bargaining power in general, it is also directly
analogous to strike power, an ingredient of bargaining power. In a relation-
ship where there is no union representing "A," but merely individual
8 Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161, 52 L.Ed. 436 (1908), Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 59
L.Ed. 441 (1915).
9 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. 101 (1964).
10 372, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 151 (1964).
11 206, 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. 176 (1965).
12 Burtt, Labor Markets, Unions, and Government Policies, St. Martin's Press, New
York, New York (1963).
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workers, the numerator of the fraction is very small since management ("B")
may hire other workers to displace the ones now employed. With a union
representing "A" the numerator increases, balancing the relative cost.
Applying the formula to the strike situation, the numerator represents
lost profits to management and the denominator represents the increase in
cost of the union's demand. Therefore, the possibility of the use of strike
power and the duration of its use is dependent upon this relationship of
profits to costs as calculated by management. The equality exists in trading
increased costs in exchange for the chance of loss of future profits, a form
of quid pro quo.
The advantage of strike power as seen through the use of the formula
is self-determination in search for an equilibrium from a position of greater
equality. Since the equilibrium is always between the ends of the spectrum
the strike power merely seeks to move the spectrum to a more equitable set
of alternatives.
THE OVERFLOW OF COSTS
The problem as viewed by millions of Americans is that the cost aspect
of Chamberlain's Formula overflows from the labor-management relation-
ship to other interdependent areas of the nation whose only reward comes
from a cessation in the polarity of the parties. The public interest thereby
becomes affected. W. Willard Wirtz has stated, "The public interest includes,
perhaps most significantly today, the achievements of the nation's full capac-
ity for economic growth."'13 In terms of our model, a strike affects the public
interest when the costs overflow to the point that the economic growth of
the nation is severely injured or, as enunciated in the Taft-Hartley law, when
the costs overflow to the point where the nation's health and safety is en-
dangered.
The focal point of the controversy today is the cost overflow and the
point where the overflow becomes critical in relation to the nation's economic
growth, health or safety. While this overflow does create the conflict, the
number of disputes creating "waves" large enough to affect the public inter-
est are few in relation to the total number of disputes.
There are basically three factors affecting the seriousness of the overflow
upon the public: the type of industry, the relative number of workers in-
volved, and its timing and duration. 14 The Taft-Hartley Act was enacted to
deal with overflow situations where these three factors create a national
emergency by providing for an 80 day "cooling-off" period. This period is
designed to allow collective bargaining while "damming up" the overflow.
However, after the 80 day period the "dam" is reopened and the overflow
13 Wirtz, Labor and the Public Interest, Harper & Row, New York, New York, (1963).
14 Supra note 12.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
may continue. The benefits of the Act, therefore, are only temporary, and
upset the delicate balance of the Chamberlain Formula by creating inequal-
ity of bargaining positions in favor of management.
REQUISITES OF POWER
Unions have been severely criticized for their continued perseverance
in maintaining strikes against the public interest. Since our society is plural-
istic and the workers of America owe allegiance to other institutions other
than the union, it is unfair to attack the strike power and unions without
analyzing the necessity for the power.
While a measure of the effect of the strike upon the public interest is
the number of employees involved, that same measure dictates the necessity
of strike power. The greater the number of laborers involved, the greater
the number of laborers deprived of self-determination if the strike power
is taken away. Since the growth of interdependence in the economic sphere is
continuing, the greater will be the number of laborers deprived. In a wholly
interdependent society, all laborers will be deprived of their equality "for
their own benefit."
To solve this problem an alternative to striking must be provided which
in no way deprives the laborers of their bargaining power if both the public
interest and laborers are to be served. Such a solution must include the right
of self-determination and equality of bargaining power. The right to strike
in itself is not important; the power it gives in achievement of equality is.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
There have been many measures proposed to replace the strike. This
discussion will cover nine representative solutions and criticisms of each.
Since the problems of private employees and public employees are different,
the right of public employees to strike will be discussed in a separate section.
LABOR-MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS' 5
In such industries as the coal industry and garment industry, labor-
management organizations have been created. They are representative bodies
of both sides and their chief job is to prevent strikes by defining issues,
making factual studies and proposing settlements. At the collective bargain-
ing sessions the organization functions as a mediator.
While this system recognizes the right to self-determination and does
not tamper with the equality of the parties, its usefulness ends, except for
mediation, when the parties have great difficulty in resolving the problems.
Strikes may still ensue and the public interest will still be injured.
15 Supra note 13.
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PARTIAL SHUT-DOWNS 16
The theory of partial shut-down is based on the observation that the
public interest may still be served in a strike situation if only a small segment
of the industry is shut down, thereby providing services and minimizing
profits at the same time.
The problems with this method are the determination of the amount of
the whole to be shut down, which factories are to be shut down, and how to
off-set the competitive advantage created in favor of the firms allowed to
operate.
SMALLER BARGAINING UNITS'
7
This proposal suggests that unions be segmented into local bargaining
units, preventing national strikes. In this manner no one strike could seri-
ously affect the national interest.
This segmented unionism would create geographic discrimination and
a division of union expertise, crippling smaller industrial locals with less
bargaining strategy than they had before. This theory would also lead to
geographic segregation in an economy which is rapidly going in the opposite
direction.
NATIONAL POLL1 8
This proposal suggests that when the government declares that the
strike is a national emergency, a national poll of all citizens be taken to
determine whether the laborers should go back to work.
This proposal is repugnant to both self-determination of laborers and
equality. If the workers are forced to go back to work, their bargaining posi-
tion is severely limited and the spectrum of alternative settlements shifts
toward the management position.
PUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES' 9
Since the public interest is affected, some advocate that representatives
of the public be present as a bargaining unit at the collective bargaining
sessions.
This proposal is weak, since the public pressure is always present, and
at best the third party's presence could be nothing more than as a mediator.
A third weakness is that bargaining by this method might lead to political
repercussions and influence upon the third party representative.
16 Givens, Dealing With National Emergency Labor Disputes, 34 Temp. L.Q. 17 (1963).
17 Ibid.
1S Rothenberg, National Emergency Disputes: A Proposed Solution, 65 Dick. L. Rev.
1 (1960).
19 Cooper, Protecting the Public Interests in Labor Disputes, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 873
(1960).
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ANTI-TRUST LAWS2 0
This theory advocates making anti-trust laws applicable to unions when
they are in restraint of trade.
Since, in essence, restraint of trade is the bargaining power of unions,
such a suggestion would lead to a severe shift in the balance of power be-
tween union and management.
LABOR COURTS
21
Another measure, propounded by Senator Smathers of Florida, is to
create a supreme court for labor relations. Unresolved disputes would be
submitted to the court, and the court would have the power to enter binding
judgments as to settlement.
This method is repugnant to the self-determination theory and places
the workers in a position of accepting terms which they consider wholly
inadequate. A great secondary problem also arises. Governmental inter-
vention into a private dispute leads to greater inflexibility on the part of
both labor and management. By exaggerating their demands and refusing
to compromise both sides will seek to influence the court. Thirdly, the politi-
cal factor of not offending either party, especially in election years, would
be present.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
2 2
Another theory is to create an administrative agency of national emer-
gency strikes which would define the issues, make fact findings, publicize
the issues, and invoke sanctions against unwarranted action.
This theory has the same weaknesses as the labor court theory in that
political decisions may enter into the considerations.
HAZARD PLAN
23
The Hazard Plan would create an industrial Peace Commission of men
appointed by the President. In case of a national emergency strike, either
labor or management could call upon the IPC to define issues, hear third
parties, make fact findings, and recommend solutions. If management re-
jected the recommendation, labor could strike. If labor rejected, the IPC
would conduct a vote involving all union members. If the members voted
for the proposal it would become binding. If the proposal was rejected by
the union members they could strike.
20 Ibid.
21 61 Lab. Rel. Rep. 42 (1966).
22 Supra note 19.
23 Sherman, Critique of the Hazard Plan-Strikes and People, 28 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
391 (1967).
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There are three problems with this plan. The first problem is that it
becomes ineffective if management or the rank and file reject the proposal.
Secondly, the rank and file are, generally, as demanding or more so than
their union representatives, making the vote provision meaningless. Thirdly,
the union vote undermines the representative functions of the union repre-
sentatives.
A NEw PROPOSAL
All of the above proposals in relation to employees of private industry
have the same weaknesses: (1) failure to ultimately protect what they seek to,
i.e., the public interest; (2) failure to protect self-determination for laborers;
(3) failure to protect equality of the parties; and (4) failure to insulate the
problem from political considerations. The issue must be handled in a differ-
ent form.
Since protection of the public interest in these national emergency
strikes is one determinant of a successful proposal, strikes in these areas must
be abolished in favor of another method. Since self-determination and equal-
ity of the parties are determinants, normally in opposition to the public
interest, the substitution must provide for preservation of these principles.
To facilitate these principles a National Finance Trustee Commission
should be created. The members would be appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. If a strike was to be called in an indus-
try which the President considered to be in one of the following categories
he would order the NFTC to assume jurisdiction.
Strikes under jurisdiction of NFTC:
(1) Strikes affecting the national defense.
(2) Strikes severely affecting the balance of payments.
(3) Strikes having a substantial effect on Gross National Product.
(4) Strikes affecting the national health and safety.
The NFTC would then be authorized to seek a strike injunction against
the union. The agency would then create two separate trust funds. The first
trust fund would be a Wage-Pension Trust Fund, the "res" of which would
consist of contributions wholly from the industry equal to an amount pre-
scribed by the following formula:
(Union demands-Present wage) - (Management offer-present wage)
'Res" -
2
If in the discretion of the NFTC the payments were too high or low, it
would be empowered to adjust. The payments would be made monthly.
The fund would be held in trust until settlement and be used to pay workers
retroactive benefits plus interest earned from the date of injunction.
The second trust fund would be a Profit Trust Fund, into which man-
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agement would pay their quarterly profit figure adjusted to a seasonal
average. All declarations of future dividends and future investment would
be illegal. The corporation would be excused from performance of all con-
tracts involving reinvestment entered into within the previous twelve months
until settlement of the dispute.
The NFTC would have no further function except to manage the trust
funds and receive periodic payments unless: (I) both parties requested
NFTC to act as a mediator, or (2) both parties requested NFTC to arbitrate
the dispute.
The effect of this proposal would be to protect the public interest. The
union would be protected, since collective bargaining would continue and
retroactive wage benefits would be paid. Management would gain no profit
advantage until settlement, since all new equity financing and disbursal
would be curtailed. To insure that the corporation would not seek outside
financing on the basis of their Profit Trust Fund, all declarations and facili-
tations toward reinvestments projects could be declared illegal. This would
not be in violation of the Constitution since no governmental taking would
be involved, only a trust created.
The incentives to settle the dispute would still be present. Management
would be pressured by stockholders and the unions would be pressured for
the increased benefits by the rank and file.
In this way national emergency strikes would not occur and the union
power would not be undermined. The balance of bargaining power would
remain. The parties would still be allowed to collectively bargain. Privacy of
the settlement would be maintained.
THE STRIKE AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
The strike power in relation to public employees is significantly differ-
ent. Legal treatment of the right to organize and strike has been conserva-
tive.24 Even the mere value of the strike power itself is questionable. Since
governmental agencies are non-profit making, the relative costs under
Chamberlain's Formula shift considerably. The cost of government in dis-
agreeing with the union's demands are the same to the employers (the
people) as they are to the employee, who becomes as adversely affected as
anyone else. Therefore, the value of the strike power is questionable.
Calvin Coolidge said that there is no right to strike against the public
at any time, at any place, and for any reason. This is the reiteration of the
sovereignty theory.2 5 This theory holds that a strike against government is
24 See Sullivan, How Can the Problem of the Public Employees' Strike Be Resolved?,
19 Okla. L. Rev. 365 (1966).
25 Hoffman, Right of Public Employees to Strike, 16 DePaul L. Rev. 151 (1966).
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illegal, since the government is the implementation of the sovereignty of the
people. This theory overlooks the various functions of governmental em-
ployees. Its dogmatism rests upon the fear of police and firemen strikes and
grows weak when we consider bench painters working for a park district.
A second anti-strike theory is the prestige theory.26 This theory main-
tains that strikes by public employees are intolerable, since they damage the
prestige of government. This theory seems to be as outdated as the theory
of the divine right of kings. Government's prestige is based upon how it
serves all the people. It cannot serve well, and, if you wish, prestigiously, if
it forsakes any group under it.
Without self-determination these public employees are becoming second
class citizens. If strikes are ineffective or too dangerous to the public health
and safety, an alternative must be found.
SOLUTIONS
If a solution to the problem is to be found, it must again protect the
public interest and the workers' interest. Most of the already suggested solu-
tions are unsatisfactory and will be enumerated and criticized below.
POLITICAL PERSUASION AND PRESSURE
2 7
This theory maintains that public employees have the sympathy of the
people, who, if aroused, can exert pressure upon their elected officials to
increase their benefits.
This "nice guy" approach is based upon two misconceptions. The first
is that political action in a representative democracy is direct and immediate.
More often than not, the exertion of power at the level of the people in
non-election times is unfelt at the top, the representative level. This is evi-
denced by the existence of power groups who must exert considerable effort
to effectuate their policies into governmental action. Secondly, sentiment for
public employees is not uniform and varies from policeman to garbageman.
MEDIATION
28
Mediation is helpful but mediation without strike power or third party
compulsion is dictatorial and a mere sham.
ARBITRATION29
Arbitration is excellent for those employees who, because they serve the
national health and safety, cannot strike, since third party decision is better
26 Ibid.
27 Moberly, The Strike and Its Alternatives in Public Employment, 1966 Wis. L. Rev.
549 (1966).
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
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than unilateral decision by the government. It overlooks, however, the gov-
ernment employees who may strike without harming the interest of the
people.
PICKETING30
Picketing is a mere facilitation of the political persuasion theory with
its inherent weaknesses and has been declared illegal where it exerts a
coercive force upon a more important government function. 31
THREAT TO STRIKE
This is useless without the right to strike.
A NEW PROPOSAL
Governmental employees should be classified into three categories and
dealt with separately.
Public Employees in Protective Roles
These employees include all those who, if they went on strike, would
create imminent danger to the public health or safety, such as policemen
and firemen. They should be allowed to organize but not to strike. Com-
pulsory arbitration should be required so that an outside third party could
determine the equities.
Public Employees in Ministerial Roles
These employees include all those who would not create imminent
danger to the public health and safety if they went on strike, but who could
create severe problems if the strike were a prolonged one, such as clerical
workers. These employees should be able to organize and strike, but if the
strike is prolonged should be required to submit to compulsory arbitration.
Public Employees in Non-Essential Roles
These are the employees who can in no way affect the public health and
safety such as park bench painters. They should be allowed to organize and
strike at will.
CONCLUSION
The right of self-determination and equality must be maintained for
every American worker. If a strike adversely affects the national interest, a
substitute should be used which maintains the same integrity. If public em-
ployees are to maintain equality with other workers they must be allowed to
organize, and either arbitrate or, in the case of non-essential jobs, strike.
CHARLES W. STAUDENMAYER
30 Supra note 25.
81 Bd. of Education v. Redding, 32 I1. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965).
